Pavuk v. Amazon.com by United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
KELLY PAVUK, on behalf of herself and
others similarly situated,
Plaintiff,
v.
AMAZON.COM, INC. AMAZON.COM
DEDC, LLC, and AMAZON.COM DEDC,
INC.,
Defendants.
CIVIL ACTION NO.
NOTICE OF REMOVAL FROM STATE COURT
Defendants Amazon.com, Inc., Amazon.com DEDC, LLC, and Amazon.com DEDC,
Inc.1 (collectively, “Defendants”), by their undersigned attorneys, hereby give notice that,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441, 1446, and 1453, this action is removed from the Luzerne
County Court of Common Pleas to the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania. As grounds for removal, Defendants state as follows:
I. THE STATE COURT ACTION
1. On or about October 3, 2013, Plaintiff Kelly Pavuk (“Pavuk”) commenced a
putative class action by Complaint against Defendants entitled Pavuk v. Amazon.com, Inc. et al.,
Case No. 2013-11565-0, in the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas (the “Complaint”). A
true and correct copy of the Summons and Complaint is attached as Exhibit A.
2. On or about October 4, 2013, counsel for Defendants accepted service of the
Complaint.
1 Although named as a defendant, Amazon.com DEDC, Inc. does not currently exist.
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23. On or about October 9, 2013, Pavuk and Defendants agreed upon and entered into
a Stipulation whereby Defendants were permitted to move, answer, or otherwise respond to the
Complaint on or before November 8, 2013. A true and correct copy of the Stipulation is attached
as Exhibit B.
4. No other proceedings have been held in this action, and the Summons, Complaint,
and October 9, 2013 Stipulation constitute all processes and pleadings in this action.
5. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants jointly operate a 630,000 square foot logistics
facility located in Hazleton, Pennsylvania (the “Facility”) and that Defendants did not properly
compensate Plaintiff while she worked at the Facility. See Exhibit A (Complaint), ¶¶ 8-10, 48.
More specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to comply with the requirements of the
Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act (“PMWA”), 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 333.102 et seq. Id. at ¶ 48.
Plaintiff asserts claims on behalf of a putative class of other individuals who have worked for
Defendants at the Facility since October 3, 2010.2 Id. at ¶¶ 35, 48.
II. REMOVAL IS TIMELY
6. This Notice of Removal is timely filed, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), as it is
being filed within thirty (30) days after October 4, 2013, the date upon which Defendants
accepted service of Plaintiff’s Complaint.
7. No previous Notice of Removal has been filed with this Court for the relief sought
herein.
III. GROUNDS FOR REMOVAL
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 establishes when an action is removable. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)
provides that “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United
2 Defendants do not concede, and reserve the right to contest, Plaintiff’s allegation that this
lawsuit properly can proceed as a class action.
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3States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the
district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such
action is pending.”
9. This Court’s subject matter jurisdiction, and the basis for removal, is founded
upon 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441, 1446, and 1453.
IV. ORIGINAL SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
10. The Court has original jurisdiction over this action pursuant to the Class Action
Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”), codified in relevant part in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2).
11. CAFA provides for federal subject matter jurisdiction over any class action in
which (1) the matter in controversy exceeds a specified jurisdictional minimum of $5 million,
(2) the aggregate number of putative class members in all proposed plaintiff classes is at least
100, and (3) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a different state from any
defendant. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2), 1332(d)(5).
12. Although Defendants deny Plaintiff’s factual allegations and that she or the class
she purports to represent is entitled to the relief requested, based on Plaintiff’s allegations in the
Complaint and prayer for relief, all requirements for jurisdiction under CAFA have been met in
this case. Accordingly, diversity of citizenship exists under CAFA, and this Court has original
jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2).
A. The Amount Plaintiff Places in Controversy Exceeds $5 Million
13. Although Plaintiff’s Complaint is silent on the specific amount of damages,
Plaintiff’s bare allegations are enough to show that the amount in controversy exceeds the
jurisdictional minimum.3
3 Defendants dispute, and reserve the right to contest, that any amount is owed to either
Plaintiff or the putative class members that she seeks to represent. Yet, the amount in
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414. When a complaint does not aver “that the amount in controversy is less than the
jurisdictional minimum” required under CAFA, as is the case here, the case will only be
remanded “if it appears to a legal certainty that the plaintiff cannot recover the jurisdictional
amount.” See Frederico v. Home Depot, Inc., 507 F.3d 188, 197 (3rd Cir. 2007). Congress has
stated that “if a federal court is uncertain about whether ‘all matters in controversy’ in a
purported class action ‘do not in the aggregate exceed the sum or value of $5,000,000,’ the court
should err in favor of exercising jurisdiction over the case.” See S. REP. 109-14, at 42 (2005)
(citation omitted).
15. For cases being removed pursuant to CAFA, “determining the amount in
controversy begins with a reading of the complaint filed in the state court.” Frederico, 507 F.3d
at 197 (quoting Samuel–Bassett v. KIA Motors America, Inc., 357 F.3d 392, 398 (3d Cir. 2004)).
In this matter, Plaintiff purports to represent a class consisting of all “Warehouse Workers” that
have worked at the Facility since October 3, 2010. See Exhibit A (Complaint), ¶¶ 11, 18, 35.
16. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated the PMWA by not compensating all
Warehouse Workers during the end-of-shift screening process that “approximately takes between
10 and 20 minutes, and, with delays … can last longer.” See Exhibit A (Complaint), ¶ 25.
Plaintiff alleges further that the Defendants violated the PMWA by not compensating all
Warehouse Workers for passing through the same screening process during meal breaks or for
walking to that screening area. See id. at ¶¶ 28-32, 48.
17. Taken together, Plaintiff explicitly claims that each member of the putative class
is entitled to compensation for 20 to 40-plus minutes, and more “with delays” (such as from
individual searches using a metal detecting wand and/or inspection of bags and personal items –
controversy requirement is satisfied for purposes of removal by Plaintiff’s allegations in
the Complaint.
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5see Exhibit A (Complaint), ¶¶ 22-24), of uncompensated time for every day a putative class
member has to go through security screening, which Plaintiff alleges has occurred about twice
per week (Compl. ¶¶ 26, 32) for each individual who has worked at the Facility since October 3,
2010. Using a modest 2.5 minutes’ average additional “delay” based on Plaintiff’s allegation of
10-20 minutes per instance but often with longer delays, this is the equivalent of at least 45 to 85
minutes per week, and possibly more, with the median being at least 65 minutes per week, given
Plaintiff’s allegation that she “was forced to proceed through a metal detector prior to exiting the
Center at least twice a week” and that she “was forced to proceed through a metal detector at
least twice a week during her 30-minute unpaid meal break.” See Exhibit A (Complaint) at ¶¶
26, 32.
18. Plaintiff alleges further that Defendants “automatically deduct 30 minutes from
Warehouse Workers’ compensable time each shift for an unpaid meal break,” “require
Warehouse Workers to remain at their work locations within the Facility until the start of the
purported 30-minute meal break,” and that “[a]fter the start of the 30-minute meal break,
Warehouse Workers walk to the [Facility’s] time clocks and clock-out.” See Exhibit A
(Complaint), ¶¶ 28-30.
19. Taken together, these allegations of the Complaint claim that the putative class
has been deprived of well more than 10 minutes out of their 30-minute unpaid lunch break (i.e.,
10-20 minutes or more of screening plus time spent walking to time clocks), which reduces the
unpaid lunch break (according to Plaintiff’s allegations) to less than 20 minutes. In so doing, it
is reasonable to assume that Plaintiff is seeking compensation for the entirety of her and putative
class members’ lunch breaks. See 29 CFR 785.19 (defining non-compensable “bona fide meal
period” as usually any amount of time 30-minutes or more); 29 CFR 785.18 (stating that 5 to 20
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6minutes of “rest” is compensable); see, e.g., Atkinson v. House of Raeford Farms, Inc., 6:09-CV-
01901-JMC, 2012 WL 2871747 (D.S.C. July 12, 2012) (finding that a lunch break under 20
minutes is actually a compensable break). Defendants dispute that the Plaintiff could recover
this relief under Pennsylvania law or that the factual record will support her allegations, but
under Plaintiff’s theory the putative class members would be entitled to a total amount of at least
85 to 105 minutes per week in alleged uncompensated time, with the median being at least 95
minutes.
20. Plaintiff seeks to recover not only purported damages accrued at the time of filing,
but also damages that continue to accrue during the course of this lawsuit. See Exhibit A
(Complaint), ¶ 35 (stating that the action is brought on behalf of Plaintiff and “all individuals
employed at the [Facility] who, during any workweek since October 3, 2010, have been required
by Defendants to proceed through the screening process . . . .” (emphasis added)).
21. Accordingly, the amount of continuing liability for any current hourly employee
within the putative class should be considered in calculating the amount in controversy. See
Broglie v. MacKay-Smith, 541 F.2d 453, 455 (4th Cir. 1976) (“[D]amages which the plaintiff
claims will accrue in the future are properly counted against the jurisdictional amount if a right to
future payments . . . will be adjudged in the present suit.”). This concept is common in
employment disputes involving back-pay, front-pay, or lost wages, with courts routinely
including liability that continues throughout litigation in the amount in controversy. See, e.g.,
Chabal v. Reagan, 822 F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that “the amount in controversy cannot
be considered only the amount of back pay accrued at the time of filing,” but should also should
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7consider whether “recovery would exceed [the minimum] through the continuing accrual of back
pay during the course of litigation”).4
22. The ruling in Mazzucco v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., No. 11–2430, 2011 WL
6935320 (D.N.J. Nov. 23, 2011), is instructive. In Mazzucco, the plaintiff in a wage and hour
dispute defined the putative class—just as Plaintiff has here—to include current and former
employees. Id. at *7. Noting that alleged violations continued throughout the lawsuit, the Court
held:
An accurate reflection of damages would include the unpaid wages during the
course of the litigation. The right to collect damages accruing subsequent to the
filing of the complaint will be adjudicated in this matter. Therefore, it is proper
for this Court to include those damages in its amount in controversy analysis.
Id. at *8 (internal citations omitted); accord Faltaous v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 07-1572, 2007
WL 3256833, at *9-10 (D.N.J. Nov. 5, 2007) (finding the application of this approach to a wage
4 See also, e.g., Shaw v. Gwatney, 795 F.2d 1351, 1355-56 (8th Cir. 1986) (the amount of
a claim for back pay “is not the amount . . . accrued at the time of filing but the total
amount of back pay the plaintiff stands ultimately to recover in the suit”); Goble v.
Marsh, 684 F.2d 12, 15 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“By its very nature, a back pay claim continues
to accrue between filing of the complaint and entry of final judgment.”); Andrews v. E.I.
Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 447 F.3d 510, 515 (7th Cir. 2006) (considering future lost
wages as factor in satisfying jurisdictional minimum); White v. Loomis Armored US,
Inc., 729 F. Supp. 2d 897, 902 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (“With respect to the lost wages, courts
have used the wages the plaintiff stands to recover by the time the case concludes in
calculating the amount in controversy.”); Reinhardt v. Mont. Human Rights Bureau, 2010
WL 5391280, at *3 (D. Mont. Dec. 17, 2010) (including alleged back- and front-pay in
jurisdictional analysis, both of which were still accruing during litigation); DeWolff v.
Hexacomb Corp., 2009 WL 2370723, at *3 (W.D. Mich. July 30, 2009) (concluding that
if plaintiff prevails, he could recover back-pay “for the period from the filing of the
complaint until entry of judgment in this case”); Logsdon v. Duron, Inc., 2005 WL
1163095, at *4-5 (M.D. Fla. May 17, 2005) (using back- and front-pay accruing up to and
until the time of trial in finding that plaintiff’s complaint satisfied the amount-in-
controversy requirement); Savage v. Envirotest Sys. Corp., 1996 WL 732551, at *3 (D.
Conn. Dec. 13, 1996) (observing that “[i]t is reasonable to assume that this action,
allowing for discovery and dispositive motions, will not be tried for another year . . .
[t]hus, if [plaintiff] ultimately prevails, her accrued backpay and employment benefits
alone will likely exceed [the jurisdictional minimum]”).
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8and hour class action consistent with “the norm in employment cases in which backpay and
frontpay are routinely awarded”). The same reasoning applies to Plaintiff’s claims here.5
23. To determine the appropriate time period for assessing the amount in controversy
where damages continue to accrue after a complaint is filed, courts have relied upon the median
interval between the time of filing a civil case in the district through disposition after trial, as
reported annually by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. See Mazzucco, 2011
WL 6935320, at *8; Faltaous, 2007 WL 3256833, at *10; DeWolff, 2009 WL 2370723, at *3.
Other courts have simply estimated the time it would take until the case would be tried. See,
e.g., Savage, 1996 WL 732551, at *3.
24. The median time interval from the filing of a civil case in the Middle District of
Pennsylvania through trial is 25.5 months. See Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics, Table C-5,
“U.S. District Courts—Median Time Intervals From Filing to Disposition of Civil Cases
Terminated, by District and Method of Disposition, During the 12-Month Period Ending March
31, 2012,” available online at
http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics
/2012/tables/C05Mar12.pdf (last visited November 1, 2013). As this is the median time through
trial for all civil cases in the Middle District of Pennsylvania – including single-plaintiff and
cases and other far less complex matters than alleged here – this period is undoubtedly shorter
than reasonably can be anticipated for a class action such as this matter.
5 Taking into account any damages accruing after a lawsuit is filed is entirely consistent
with the general rule that jurisdiction must be determined based upon the circumstances
prevailing at the time of removal. Whether such damages are “in controversy” is still
determined by analyzing a plaintiff’s complaint at that time, even though those damages
may accrue after the lawsuit is filed. See, e.g., Mazzucco, 2011 WL 6935320, at *3 (as
applied to future damages, “limiting the amount in controversy analysis to the date upon
which the removal was filed is too restrictive [and] an appropriate amount in controversy
analysis considers the pleadings as well as damages accruing in the future”).
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925. In any event, using just the median interval for civil cases in the Middle District
of Pennsylvania, a potential trial in this matter will not be completed until November 18, 2015—
25 months and 15 days from the date this action was initiated. Accordingly, the putative class
members’ claimed damages encompass at least the dates between October 3, 2010 and
November 18, 2015.
26. Plaintiff states in the Complaint that Defendants failed to compensate putative
class members “for all hours worked both after their paid shifts and during their unpaid 30-
minute breaks,” and also failed to pay them “the legally mandated overtime premium for such
work on those occasions where their work exceeded 40 hours in a workweek.” See Exhibit A
(Complaint), ¶ 48.
27. In addition to overtime, Plaintiff also seeks straight time damages (on her behalf
and on behalf of the putative class) for allegedly unpaid hours worked under 40 in any given
week, at least for those weeks where the claimant’s total combined paid time and allegedly
unpaid time exceeds 40 hours for the week. The Prayer for Relief specifically seeks “other and
further relief” beyond unpaid overtime wages. See Exhibit A (Complaint), Prayer for Relief, ¶¶
B, E. Plaintiff also refers multiple times to employees allegedly not being paid for all hours
worked and/or “all time that Warehouse Workers are required by Defendants to be on the
premises” – separate and apart from her allegations that Defendants failed to pay overtime. See
id. at ¶¶ 17, 27, 38, 45, 47, 48. Furthermore, by e-mail dated November 1, 2013, Plaintiff’s
counsel confirmed Plaintiff’s position that “during weeks in which Plaintiff and the class
members’ combined paid and unpaid compensable time exceeds 40 hours, Plaintiff and the class
members are entitled to (i) compensation at their regular pay rate for uncompensated hours
worked under 40 hours and (ii) compensation at their overtime premium pay rate for
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uncompensated hours worked over 40 hours.” Plaintiff’s counsel further advised that “Plaintiff
is not seeking damages for those workweeks in which the combined paid and unpaid
compensable time does not exceed 40 hours.”
28. To determine damages and potential members of the putative class, Defendants
based their assumptions on the following:6
a) If the sum of the employee’s weekly regular worked hours plus the
unpaid time did not exceed 40 hours, the unpaid time was paid at the
employee’s straight time rate.
b) If the sum of the employee’s weekly regular worked hours plus the
unpaid time did exceed 40 hours, the unpaid time up to 40 hours was
paid at the employee’s straight time rate and the unpaid time over 40
hours was paid at the employee’s overtime rate.
c) The employee’s straight time rate is equal to the employee’s hourly
rate plus any shift differential.
d) The employee’s overtime pay rate is the straight time rate plus any
shift differential multiplied by one-and-one-half.
e) If an employee was not employed or was on leave for a portion of a
week then that week is excluded from the damage estimate and class
of putative class members.
6 Defendants utilize bi-weekly payroll data, as employees are paid on every other Friday for
work conducted in the prior two weeks from Sunday through Saturday. Exhibit C, ¶ 5
(Declaration of Amy J. Purdie). Defendants’ payroll data contained the total number of
regular hours and overtime hours the employee earned in each two-week pay period but did
not show how the hours were distributed across the two weeks. Id. at ¶ 6. Accordingly, the
following assumptions were made in calculating damages:
a) If the employee had 80 regular hours over a two-week period, that employee worked
40 regular hours in each week.
b) If the employee had less than 80 regular hours and more than zero overtime hours
over a two-week period, that employee worked 40 hours in one week of the pay
period and the remainder of the regular hours in the other week.
c) If the employee had less than 80 regular hours and no overtime hours over a two-
week period, that employee worked half of the regular hours in the first week and
half of the regular hours in the second week.
Id. at ¶ 7.
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Exhibit C, ¶ 8 (Declaration of Amy J. Purdie).
29. The assumptions were based on data provided by Defendants reflecting hire dates,
leave of absence dates, and termination dates for the putative class members. See Exhibit C, ¶ 3
(Declaration of Amy J. Purdie).
30. Using Plaintiff’s definition of Warehouse Workers, the theory of relief noted in
the Complaint, and the above-noted data and assumptions, Defendants have determined that
there are currently at least 2,064 members in Plaintiff’s putative class – all hourly employees of
Defendants who would have passed through security screening. See Exhibit A (Complaint), ¶¶
11, 35, 48; see also Exhibit C, ¶ 9 (Declaration of Amy J. Purdie).
31. Based on the noted number of putative class members, their work weeks during
the claimed liability period described above, and the median uncompensated wages alleged in the
Complaint of 95 minutes per week (including Plaintiff’s claim to recover additional wages for
the entirety of each 30-minute lunch break), the putative class seeks at least $3,842,023 in
damages against Defendants. See Exhibit C, ¶ 10 (Declaration of Amy J. Purdie). This amount
includes $1,974,320 in damages calculated between October 3, 2010 and the date of Defendants’
last payroll, October 5, 2013, and the additional damages through anticipated trial from October
6, 2013 to November 18, 2015 (based on the median 25.5 months to trial in the Middle District
of Pennsylvania), which in total equals $1,867,703. See id.
32. Plaintiff, however, also seeks attorneys’ fees. See Exhibit A (Complaint), Prayer
for Relief, ¶ C. In determining the amount in controversy for purposes of removal, attorneys’
fees in the amount of 30% may be aggregated with the claimed damages. Frederico, 507 F.3d at
199 (considering attorneys’ fees of 30% when calculating amount in controversy); Lorah v.
SunTrust Mortgage, Inc., CIV.A. 08-703, 2009 WL 413113 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 18, 2009); Hoffman
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v. Nutraceutical Corp., CIV. 12-5803-ES-SCM, 2013 WL 885169, *4 (D.N.J. Jan. 24, 2013);
Andrews v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. 03-5200, 2010 WL 5464303, at *3 (D. N.J. Dec. 29,
2010).
33. Based on the noted number of putative class members, their work weeks during
the claimed liability period described above, and the median uncompensated wages alleged in the
Complaint of 95 minutes per week (including Plaintiff’s claim to recover additional wages for
the entirety of each 30-minute lunch break), Plaintiff seeks $1,152,606 in attorneys’ fees against
Defendants. When combined with underlying claimed damages, this results in claimed damages
of at a bare minimum $4,994,629.
34. As noted above, however, these calculations conservatively use the median
amount of time for a case to proceed through trial in the Middle District of Pennsylvania – 25.5
months. The putative class action Plaintiff has pleaded on behalf of more than 2,000 others is
undoubtedly more complex and will prove more time-consuming than the vast majority of cases
pending before this Court. If this case takes even two days longer than the 25.5-month median to
proceed through trial – to November 20, 2015, the end of that week – then the value of additional
claimed damages from October 6, 2013 through November 20, 2015 will equal $1,875,797. See
Exhibit C, ¶ 10 (Declaration of Amy J. Purdie). Plaintiff’s claimed damages from October 3,
2010 through November 20, 2015 would then equal $3,850,117, which – when combined with
attorney’s fees of 30%, or $1,155,035 – will result in total claimed damages to $5,005,152. This
amount exceeds the jurisdictional threshold of $5 million under CAFA.7
7 Defendants deny the validity of Plaintiff’s allegations, and/or that Plaintiff would be
entitled to any of the relief she seeks. However, for purposes of jurisdiction under
CAFA, Defendants accept Plaintiff’s allegations solely for the purpose of establishing
that Plaintiff, through these allegations, seeks damages in excess of the jurisdictional
requirement.
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B. There Are Over 100 Putative Class Members
35. Plaintiff purports to assert claims on behalf of a putative class of all warehouse
workers that have worked at the Facility since October 3, 2010 and have combined paid and
unpaid time during a given week exceeding 40 hours. See Exhibit A (Complaint), ¶¶ 11, 35, 48.
Based on this definition, the putative class currently includes at least 2,064 putative class
members.
36. Plaintiff further alleges that “Defendants employ hundreds of Warehouse Workers
at the [Facility].” See Exhibit A (Complaint), ¶ 13. Thus, even by Plaintiff’s account the
requirement for a class of at least 100 individuals is satisfied.
C. Diversity Exists Between the Parties
37. For diversity purposes, a person is a “citizen” of the state in which he or she is
domiciled, and residence alone is enough to establish a presumption of domicile. See Anthony v.
Small Tube Mfg. Corp., 535 F. Supp.2d 506, 515 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (citizenship and domicile are
equivalent for diversity purposes); Capato v. Astrue, No. 08-5405, 2010 WL 1076522 at *6
(D.N.J. March 23, 2010) (residency establishes a presumption of domicile) (citing District of
Columbia v. Murphy, 314 U.S. 441, 455 (1941)).
38. Plaintiff admits to “residing” in Pennsylvania and should be considered a citizen
of that Commonwealth. See Exhibit A (Complaint) at ¶ 1.
39. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff is a citizen of Pennsylvania domiciled at
her last known address, 113 Washington Street, Freeland, Pennsylvania 18224.
40. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) and 1332(d)(10), a corporation or unincorporated
association is deemed to be a citizen of the State where it has its principal place of business and
the State under whose laws it is incorporated or organized.
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41. Defendant Amazon.com, Inc. is a Delaware corporation, with a principal place of
business in the State of Washington. And so, this Defendant is a citizen of Delaware and
Washington, while Plaintiff is a citizen of Pennsylvania.
42. Defendant Amazon.com DEDC, LLC is a Delaware corporation, with a principal
place of business in the State of Washington. And so, this Defendant is a citizen of Delaware
and Washington, while Plaintiff is a citizen of Pennsylvania.
43. Although purported to be named as a Defendant, Amazon.com DEDC, Inc. does
not currently exist. At all times during which Amazon.com DEDC, Inc. existed, it was a
Delaware corporation with a principal place of business in the State of Washington.
V. OTHER PREREQUISITES FOR REMOVAL HAVE BEEN SATISFIED
44. Venue is proper in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) because the
Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas, where this action was filed and had been pending prior
to removal, is a state court within this federal district and division.
45. Defendants will promptly file a certified copy of this Notice of Removal with the
Prothonotary for the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas in accordance with 28 U.S.C.
§ 1446(d).
46. Written notice of the filing of this Notice of Removal has been or will be given to
Plaintiff in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d).
47. A completed Federal Civil Cover Sheet accompanies this Notice of Removal.
48. If any question arises as to the propriety of the removal of this action, Defendants
request the opportunity to present both a brief and oral argument in support of its position that
this case is removable.
Case 3:13-cv-02698-MEM   Document 1   Filed 11/01/13   Page 14 of 16
15
WHEREFORE, Defendants respectfully request that all further proceedings in the
Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas be discontinued and that this suit be removed to the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania.
Date: November 1, 2013 Respectfully submitted,
MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP
By: /s/ Michael J. Puma
Richard G. Rosenblatt (Bar # 59096)
Michael J. Puma (Bar # 94463)
1701 Market Street
Philadelphia, PA 19103
215.963.5000 (telephone)
215.963.5001 (facsimile)
Counsel for Defendants
Amazon.com, Inc.,
Amazon.com.DEDC, LLC,
Amazon.com DEDC, Inc.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Michael J. Puma, hereby certify that a true and correct copy of Defendants’ Notice of
Removal (and Exhibits A-C thereto) was filed via ECF and served via electronic and regular
mail this 1st day of November, 2013 upon:
Peter Winebrake, Esq.
R. Andrew Santillo, Esq.
Mark J. Gottesfeld, Esq.
WINEBRAKE & SANTILLO, LLC
715 Twining Road
Suite 211
Drescher, PA 19025
Todd O’Malley, Esq.
Thomas J. Gilbride, Esq.
O’MALLEY & LANGAN, PC
201 Franklin Avenue
Scranton, PA 18503
Jerry E. Martin, Esq.
David W. Garrison, Esq.
Scott P. Tift, Esq.
Seth M. Hyatt, Esq.
BARRETT JOHNSTON, LLC
217 Second Avenue North
Nashville, TN 37201
s/ Michael J. Puma
Michael J. Puma
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